“To make Christianity plausible is the same as to misinterpret it.”
— Søren Kierkegaard
Phillip Melanchthon’s Loci Communes, or Commonplaces, is a fascinating historical artifact and a useful signpost marking the junction at which Reformation thought begins its historical divergence with the magisterial trajectory of Rome. And, indeed, it is demonstrative of the reality of the depth of Protestant-Papist rift. It reveals that the doctrinal divisions so immediately characteristic of the Reformation are merely a higher-order manifestation of differences in approach to thought and knowledge themselves.
Ostensibly, these differences could be identified with the gulf between humanism and scholasticism. Melanchthon himself certainly seems content to scapegoat the scholastics as the antagonists of his work, but in this matter the very history of the Loci itself more-or-less betrays this narrative with ample irony. As Christian Preus’ helpful historical notes on the Loci indicate, the course of the Reformation generated circumstances either conducive to or coercive of a progressive expansion of the Loci into something closer to a systematic theology. This expansion encroached upon philosophical territory previously decried as fruitless and vain by Melanchthon in his much smaller first edition of Loci — leading to amusing footnotes that adjoin Melanchthon’s most stubborn refusals to elaborate further to the later context of the very same refused elaboration.
As Brett Salkeld traces in his masterful Transubstantiation, it seems that Luther and Calvin (and perhaps not a few Church Fathers) were to some extent guilty of the same naivety, as it might be called, at the outsets of their respective theological enterprises, evincing early on an aspiration to eschew philosophical inquiries they viewed as speculative, spurious, and excessive. Their later capitulation to external pressures to defend their metaphysical assumptions paints a rather fatal picture of the necessity of sophisticated philosophical imposition upon the bliss of perceived simplicity. But whether the simplicity of early Luther, Calvin, Melanchthon or any other theologian was ever real or always illusory is a question which itself argues for the necessity of philosophical sophistication. That is to say, these histories seem to demonstrate that one can only delve so deep into knowledge without eventually recognizing the complexity of the tools he’s used to dig.
At bottom, the humanist slogan of ad fontes captures the movement’s basic animus in opposition to scholastic decadence: an aim to purify knowledge through proximity to the source, especially to divine revelation in the case of theology. The driving spirit of such a movement is hardly one unique to the Reformation, but is rather a frequently recurring character throughout history. In such a broad view, the initial Protestant desire for simplicity is clearly concomitant with the historic epistemic desire for purity.
The fact is hardly insignificant that the humanist yearning for the sources was synchronous with increasing possibility of actual access to said sources. Luther’s conscience could not have been bound by the word of God if he had never gained the ability to read that word for himself. It is in this context that the Romish response to Luther uncovers the real epistemic struggle at play; namely, whether authority precedes authenticity, or vice versa. At Worms, the two poles of this axis display this opposition as it would come to define the two sides of the Reformation. Luther stands upon the premise that proximity to divine revelation itself is a surer means of true knowledge, whereas Rome decidedly asserts that restraint within its institutional bounds is the only safeguard against perverse and false knowledge. For the Protestant, immediate access is the clearest avenue to authentic knowledge. For the Catholic, access must be mediated by authority in order to be reliable.
The civilizational stalemate on this disagreement for the last half-millennium merits a sifting through of the aforementioned doctrinal disputes that have historically floated to the surface in favor of identifying the epistemic rift beneath. Further, it seems manifestly worthwhile in the face of that rift to simply take the problem into view as a whole and honestly ask how one can have knowledge of the truth at all. This can be helpfully framed as an assessment of the humanist ethos itself. Does more immediate access to revelation actually result in fewer confounding elements in the grasping of knowledge?
The notion of revelation, firstly, assumes an existence of truth and some at least particular extent at which truth is not accessible to the unaided faculties of human sense and reason. That which is revealed is, of its nature, that which could not otherwise be discovered by an observer. Revelation consists in the portion of facts which only a supernatural disclosure can render practically available to the human mind.
But even within this notion it becomes instantly clear that some mediation is necessary. “For what person knows a man’s thoughts except the spirit of the man which is in him?” Apart from the very contents of consciousness as such, there cannot be said to exist a form of knowledge which is utterly immediate. Only thought, by the fact of its subsistence within spirit, can be described as immediately available to the intellect of the spirit. So a person can immediately know his own thoughts — to say nothing of the virtue of self-reflection — which is to say nothing more than that the content of the mind is the only form of knowledge which is available to the mind without a single degree of separation. All other knowledge, as access of the mind to external truth, is necessarily mediated by the experience of consciousness. That the operations of the mind not only function as conduit but as barrier between the person and the world is ground well trod by philosophers of the modern era.
Of first importance for the epistemic quandary at hand is that the aforementioned facts seem to entail a dispensing with any notion of total purity of knowledge. That a man knows his own thoughts is, again, hardly a proof that he knows himself, and that a man cannot know himself is evidence that a man can not know anything with certainty, so long as certainty refers to utter confidence in the identity between a given mental conception and non-mental phenomenon. Completeness of confidence would assume a completeness of perspective that is simply incompatible with the natural limitations of human experience. For, insofar as a thing is seen, it is seen from a particular point of view, and thus the conception of the thing as seen is imbued indelibly with the characteristics of the point of view. The conception inherits the limitations of the perspective of consciousness, and therefore is simply unable to attain to completeness or perfection.
So, the matter of purity is rendered far more relative than it may have initially seemed. This problem certainly seems to extend itself across time as well. A natural extension of the humanist orientation ad fontes is the Protestant attitude of retrieval. But, if the basic epistemic problem of ecclesial validity at play in the Reformation can be imagined spatially as a selection from among a spread of churches, then disputes as to the validity of retrieval compound the problem through the added dimension of history. This latter dimension is, further, hardly congruent with the first, since temporal distance interferes in distinct modes with access to truth. In practice, this means that attempts to discern the historically unadulterated doctrine and practice of primitive Christianity are inevitably dogged by the irretrievability of the historical circumstances in which those doctrines were formulated and those practices lived. A pure concept of the past is utterly impossible, severely hampering the Christian faith as a forensic exercise.
Perhaps it is useful, then, to examine this question with a more direct view to the nature of truth itself and the nature of the Church as “pillar and bulwark of the truth,” since the institution of the Church and the essence of truth are indelibly linked in the Christian frame. As for truth, it has already been established that truth can never exist as itself in the mind, but can only subsist therein as encountered. The interaction of mind with truth is itself an inextricable component of their union, which vitiates any possibility of a purity of knowledge conceived as some access to truth sans mind. This does not by any means nullify the possibility (or the necessity) that truth should exist outside of the mind, but it does introduce a hard pragmatic constraint on that reality insofar as truth’s objective existence can be thought of as only indirectly relevant to consciousness. Objectivity must be considered, but can never be attained.
Truth can therefore be described as dwelling in heaven, observable but unreachable, impassible but immanent. The stars must possess being if they are to emanate perceptibility, but the fact of their being does not entail their being seen as they are, for the gulf of space between the stars and the astronomer is so vast as to be measured precisely by the degree of its temporal interference with observation. That is, the speed of light and the distance it travels to earth prevent the stars from being seen as they are in themselves, but they must in fact be in themselves if they are to be seen in any sense at all.
This conception firmly isolates truth in the mind of God, and through this divine subsistence the Church derives her relationship to truth. Further, revealed truth characterizes the Church as fundamentally a receptacle of truth, the institutional mind instructed in the secrets of the Divine. Paul extrapolates from the fact that only a man’s own spirit may contain pure knowledge that “We have the mind of Christ,” as if to insinuate that the gift of the Holy Spirit imbues the Church with the Divine self-knowledge — truth in itself. Paul writes this, no less, under inspiration, the intellectual activity of the Spirit Himself, if the Church is to be believed as to the source of her knowledge.
That final caveat draws the entire line of inquiry into a circle. If the solution to the inaccessibility of pure knowledge of the truth is the Spirit, and the Spirit indwells the Church and draws her into the truth, then it would seem that one cannot find the truth except by finding the truth! “The beginning of wisdom is this: Get wisdom, and whatever you get, get insight.” To find the true Church one needs the truth, but to find the truth one needs the true Church.
As for the Church and history, the pure facts of the primitive Church are, like the stars-in-themselves impeded by lightyears, hopelessly trapped in the moment in which they existed. Any effort at retrieval must mimic the broader search for truth in contending with this problem of inaccessibility. If it is true that the Spirit of God is shared across individuals, thus constructing the institution which agglomerates itself around the deposit of revelation, then certainly the persistence of that institution demonstrates the continuity of the Spirit across time. So the mind of Christ which was in Paul is access despite that the world of Paul has passed away.
But, to invoke something of a Hegelian sense, would this continuity of Spirit across time not reveal the Church to be a product of history? Would such a move not erase the defining boundaries of the institution, causing its spiritual uniqueness to spill out into the field of all history? Would this not make truth even more difficult to find by fatalistically rendering history the truest fact, and thereby negating any external means by which a purported Church could be verified or falsified? If the Spirit as pure truth is present in the life of the Church, how can valid history in the life of the Church (i.e., valid development) be discerned from the invalid? That is to say, how can truth hold together with an identity so seemingly diffuse?
Perhaps epistemic disaster would not necessarily follow from such an approach. To identify the Spirit in history can properly serve as the acknowledgement that identification of the Church by the Spirit does not constitute a relegation of the Spirit to the institution. Consider the case of the exorcists who were not among the disciples, yet were nonetheless for Christ. In Acts 10, the Spirit outpaces the Church, and the sacrament of baptism must be administered as a means of bringing the Church as she holds the deposit of revelation up to speed with the activity of the Spirit. That the activity of the Spirit in baptism, that is, in the Church, cannot be denied by no means entails that the activity of the Spirit outside of baptism can be categorically denied.
“The wind blows where it wills, and you hear the sound of it, but you do not know whence it comes or whither it goes; so it is with every one who is born of the Spirit.” That truth subsists in God makes it fundamentally spiritual, and so the truth adheres to the properties of spirit. It is powerful, ever-present, intangible and untamable. In the one sense, all that happens is true, therefore there can be no such thing as an invalid development in the Church. On the other hand, not every body is filled with the same spirit, so incongruity between the Spirit of God and the spirits of men remains a baleful possibility. How, then, does man attach his spirit to God’s? This is a mystery which demonstrates that truth is most properly not grasped by the intellect, but only described. It is faith which apprehends the truth. If the nature of Spirit is direction and impetus, and the function of truth is likewise to orient, then truth consists not just in that which is seen, but in where one looks.
“If any one imagines that he knows something, he does not yet know as he ought to know. But if one loves God, one is known by him.” — 1 Corinthians 8:2-3 (RSV)
“The spiritual man judges all things, but is himself to be judged by no one.” — 1 Corinthians 2:15 (RSV)

Leave a Reply