Meatistotle and Platatoes

Garrett L. White

I don’t know that much about Aristotle or Plato, admittedly. I have read about the two far more than I have read their own works. Rumor has it that Plato was pretty jacked, apparently, so I am about as physically ill-equipped to grapple with him as I am philosophically. But, I have the advantage of living millenia in the future, where Plato can neither answer me nor catch me in his pre-industrial, olympian talons. 

Plato and Aristotle, as discussed previously, make themselves known by dint of an impression in the fabric of Christian theology. This is the arena in which I plan to press my advantage, puppetting the two rock-em-sock-em style against one another. That way, neither of them can beat me up.

First, the affirmative: the strength of Plato’s metaphysics is largely in its robust teleological emphasis. In locating essence above the object, Plato aims the trajectory of ontology upward. That is to say, Plato finds that the very nature of things is in their appeal to the transcendent. A given object finds its Form, its definition in the invisible to which it points. 

It is apt that Plato describes this World of the Forms as such. The notion bears striking resemblance — indeed, finds its fulfillment — in the Kingdom of Heaven. Consider that all material reality was created ex nihilo by the Word of God, the enacted divine reason. Reason dwells in and proceeds from the mind. So, the cosmos exists at the behest of the activity of God’s mind. 

The universe is (obviously) God’s idea, but it is clear that the nature of His omnipotence is such that possessing the idea is sufficient for God to actualize it. The universe is not God’s idea in theory only but in actuality. That is, not only is the idea of the universe God’s idea, but the actual universe is God’s idea. The material itself, the physical composition of all things, every meteor, moon, mountain and molecule, is fashioned by God’s infinite imagination. Mere human beings may think in images, phantoms molded from the visible, but God’s thoughts mold the visible. God thinks in Truth, one might say, insofar as it is at all possible to speculate on God’s thoughts. His notions do not reflect reality, but cause it.

Augustine’s suggestion that sin is best conceptualized as a privation rather than a substance holds relevance here as it relates to what the Kingdom of God is. The Kingdom is actuality itself, realization of existence, renewal of being as such. It is re-creation, the revealed action and procession of the same Logos that created the cosmos, the reiteration of the beginning. It is the island of being in a sea of dissolution, the planet of life hanging in the black ocean of the void, existential terra firma on the frontier of King Jesus’ conquest of devouring emptiness.

Jesus, as the incarnate Word, is the emphatic clarification of that which was spoken in the beginning. The Spirit relays to us through Moses what God said when time started, but no one (excepting maybe the angels) was present to hear those words and witness their fruition. In Jesus, humanity witnesses the previously unseen genesis.

More still, mankind is invited to participate in the new genesis. Jesus plunges into the abyss to rescue creation from un-creation, critically, as a man. In Him, the divine touches the human and takes it through Hell up to Heaven. Jesus of Nazareth, the man, the peculiar person, in all His humanity, sits enthroned at the right hand of the Father. 

The geometry of the ascension teaches an important metaphysic. In bringing the Kingdom down, God brings man up. The same teleological vector manifests itself. In Christ, the arrow of man’s end points up. In Christ, the Platonic Form, the ideal, the definitive Man is embodied and revealed. The Idea of man, that is the Son of Man, dwells in Heaven. The Holy Spirit secures and motivates this trajectory for all individuals within the bounds of the Kingdom, transforming them by their participation in the ideal Form of Christ.

This is Plato’s greatest strength — even greater than his pro wrestler physique. For Plato, the characteristics of a thing are essentially understood with regard to the purpose after which they strive. A thing is what it’s for. A thing is a more-or-less imperfect participation in what it is meant to be. This framework maps tidily onto the biblical notions of creation as the result of God’s intent and intellect, man as the imago dei, and arguably much more. Further, the restorative nature of redemption is further understood as such through the a priori context of the imago dei as the Form of Man. Jesus is not simply creating, but re-creating, since the Form of Man always found its origin in the divine.

As alluded to previously, the biblical doctrines of the Church and the sacred mysteries entrusted to her are also neatly fitted for a Platonic paradigm, or vice versa. The Church is not identical to the Kingdom, per wheat-and-tares and what have you, but the Kingdom is in some sense the Form of the Church in which she imperfectly participates. Yes, the Kingdom is “in our midst,” but it is nonetheless “of Heaven.” The Kingdom of God is that which is on earth yet originates and terminates in Heaven. The geometry is indispensable in this matter. The Kingdom does not spring from earth. The order of operations is spelled out in Ephesians 4:10, “He who descended is he who also ascended far above all the heavens, that he might fill all things.”  

The progression from descend to ascend to fill is an essential one. Christ brings the Kingdom down from Heaven, then exalts the essence of Man and extends that exaltation throughout the cosmos through a mending of the essential ontological connection between the Logos and its creation, uniting all things in Himself (Eph. 1:10) and putting them under His feet (Eph. 1:22). That exaltation is participated in by man through the confirmation of the Holy Spirit. 

Now comes the negative. This sequence seems much less tenable in the Aristotelean scheme. If I know only a dangerous amount about Plato, I know a relatively inert amount about Aristotle. Handily, though, the medieval Roman Catholic church has already painted an idiosyncratic (and Catholicism is nothing if not idiosyncratic) portrait of what an Aristotelean theology looks like. 

If the Kingdom of Heaven/World of the Forms parallel holds — which, admittedly, might require more of a defense — then Aristotle might be accused of conflating or confusing the visible and the invisible. I contend that the visible world cannot univocally reflect the invisible because of sin. Participation in Forms is imperfect because of the corrosive privation of evil, which permits incongruities and asperities in the continuity of being that proceeds from the mouth of God. By way of a clarifying example, humanity participates in the Ideal Form of Life imperfectly since all people suffer and die. Jesus participates in Life perfectly, which is to say that He is Life and is identical to it as an Ideal, and thus overcomes death and enables those who participate in Him to do likewise.

In this Platonic paradigm, Aristotle seems to confound the aforementioned sequence of Christ’s work. The Ideal essence of humanity is found in Christ. Christ descends from and returns to dwell in Heaven. Therefore, the Ideal essence of humanity is found in Heaven. Put another way: the essence of Man, his soul, is found in the divine image. The divine image proceeds from within God to within Man, that is, through the breath of life. Therefore, the essence of Man proceeds from within God to within Man.

Because of God’s infinity, it should not be understood that in giving something He is Himself deprived of it, generally. Notwithstanding that this point is pregnant with Christological puzzles, it should not be said that in transposing His Spirit into Man that God somehow loses His Spirit. The relocation of essence from God to Man is an eternal sharing, not a transportation of some discrete, peculiar thing. Therefore, while Man’s essence is located within Himself, this location is a finite instantiation of an infinite divine substance, meaning that it is better called an incomplete or imperfect participation in an essence which is ultimately, definitively, and originally located in God. It is from Him and to Him. This leaves no room for it to be said that the essence of Man ultimately exists in Man.

It is useful again to confront Aristotle through the proxy of Roman Catholic Eucharistic theology. Since I’ve gone to great pains in the past only to obfuscate my view of the Eucharist, I shall state for the record that when I say I adhere to a primarily “symbolic” view of the Supper, I do not mean in a strict memorialist sense. I find that Adolf Harnack’s explanation of a more antique meaning of “symbol” as “a thing which in some kind of way is what it symbolizes” has become applicable to my view. As far as I’m concerned, a symbol might be defined as a thing which appeals to a Form even beyond its own. 

The Eucharist, as a divinely instituted symbol, does in some way participate in the Form of Christ’s sacrificial body and blood, though the manner of that participation seems miraculous in some sense and therefore, critically, ultimately mysterious. Michael Knowles, a papist of some apparently ichthyan variety, recently mentioned the Eucharistic miracles that have been tested all producing an AB blood type result. The Catholic view, because of Aristotle’s confounding of the procession from the transcendent, is overly natural and mechanistic. It requires a technical absurdity in the insistence that the elements can be totally blood and wine, yet not physically so. This seems rather more like a logical contradiction than a supernatural paradox. This is because, put roughly, where Plato is taken ad absurdum lies something like gnosticism, but where Aristotle is taken to the opposite extreme is found something more like materialism. It is into the latter ditch that Roman Catholicism topples over.

So, to give the devil his due and avoid driving into the opposite rut of gnosticism, Aristotle is correct to locate essences in things themselves, but only half correct. He stops short of tracing those essences as processions from the invisible, transcendent God. This procession, it should be noted, is not relegated to the origin of things, either. It is a past occurrence, a continual process and a future telos. That’s because, as John 1 demonstrates, the logic of creation is the logic of salvation. Both are Christ. 

Colossians 1:15-20 serves as an abundantly helpful text on this matter. Verse 15 might be read as finding Christ as Form, and 16 as past point and agent of origination as well as final telos. Verse 17 ties the past initiatory role of the Logos to His present, ongoing role in maintaining the composition of things. Verse 18 apprehends the Church’s participation in Christ with a view to His redemption of all creation. Verses 19 and 20 expound on these themes. There is far more to be exegeted and meditated on in this handful of verses.

It is worthy of note for the sake of context that this teleological emphasis is, in this assessment, enmeshed with a sort of Heraclitean process view of ontology. If Plato’s great contribution is a framework that enshrines direction, then Heraclitus’ is the capturing of the motion implied by direction. If the ascended Christ establishes human being, the Spirit animates its continuity. Heraclitus is another beast entirely, but it should suffice to suggest this manner in which Plato is integrated into my own philosophical persuasion and there affected by his neighbors.

Clearly, none of this amounts to an intellectual demolition of Aristotle. If nothing else, I hope I have at least evidenced the existence of a case for a more Platonic reading of the Scriptures. I have little doubt that I will visit the subject of the Eucharist again at some point. 

Plato could probably beat up Aristotle, anyway.

The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not a participation in the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not a participation in the body of Christ? — 1 Corinthians 10:16 (RSV)

4 responses to “Meatistotle and Platatoes”

  1. Tim Bonzon Avatar
    Tim Bonzon

    Really thoughtful perspective. I would agree entirely that the Platonic “World of Forms” has parallels in Christianity. I also really appreciate the statement that Plato ad absurdum would be Gnostic and Aristotle in the extreme is something like materialism. I think that’s exactly correct.

    I would only nuance your points with the following statements:

    1. The medieval Church turned Aristotelianism into Thomism which, while more material than Plato, addressed in some parts the materialism.
    2. Platonism, while philosophically enticing, is more difficult in practice.

    To elaborate on the first statement: It’s not entirely accurate to call the medieval Church Aristotelian. I understand why the label was given since it’s certainly more Aristotelian than Platonic. But it’s also true that the medieval scholastics knew exactly what you point out, that Aristotle, taken to extremes, is just materialism. For this reason, it’s said that Thomas “baptized” Aristotle, taking his framework and informing it with post-Incarnation metaphysics. The exact details of this you can find from much better sources (namely, Thomas himself) but with regard to the Eucharist, this “baptized” Aristotle lends an elegant picture into what actually happens at the Lord’s Table. Thomas, borrowing some Aristotelian language, claims that beings consist of the “accidents” and “substance.” The accidents would be the things like physical appearance, things capable of change. The “substance” (without hazarding a full definition) would be the thing underneath the accidents, the thing that doesn’t change. For example, I am still Tim Bonzon but 10 years ago I was shorter and slower and less attractive. I was still Tim Bonzon then (i.e. of the same substance) but I am now taller and faster and (marginally) more attractive (i.e. of different accidents). Thomism applied this framework to the Eucharist and claimed that after the Words of Institution, the elements are trans-substantiated. The accidents of bread and wine stay the same but the substance changes from bread and wine to the flesh and blood of Christ (respectively). More could obviously be said about this by much more qualified voices, I only include it here to argue that it transubstantiation as described by the Thomists isn’t a contradiction.

    For a little elaboration on the second statement, I am, purely through personal experience and anecdote, biased against Plato simply because it is much more difficult to be a philosophical Platonist than a philosophical Aristotelian. As you know, I do graduate work in the physical sciences and I personally I find Aristotle much more helpful in understanding the world than Plato. If I do an experiment or contemplate some sort of physical phenomenon, I take greater steps to understanding it if I take the Aristotelian approach of contemplating the Four Causes than I would if I contemplated the “Platonic Form” of the phenomenon. The Four Causes I can see or determine, the “Platonic Form” is elusive. I frequently see both philosophies at work in the science community and I’m sorry to say, purely through personal experience, the Platonists are more likely to be wrong. The Platonists would be people like the computational physicists or chemists who want to contemplate the “Platonic Form” of molecules (in fact, you can find a TED talk with David Baker, winner of the Nobel Prize, discussing his work in uncovering the “Platonic Form of a protein”). The Aristotelians would be the experimentalists, choosing empiricism over rationalism. In fact, my PhD work could be summarized as bringing Aristotelian Causality to Platonic conclusions (i.e. providing experimental evidence to the works of the computational chemists). That being said, I do still recognize the attractiveness of Platonism for the philosophy of metaphysics or even theology and I would never reject it wholesale. I would only argue that the “Platonic Form”, while useful in theory, is difficult to obtain in practice.

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    1. Garrett L. White Avatar
      Garrett L. White

      Thanks for continuing to discuss, Tim.

      To your first point, I am familiar with how Aquinas employs Aristotelian categories. A mere enumeration of his framework does not save it from being alien to reality, nor does it address my grievances — namely, that it is indeed self-contradictory in proposing a total-yet-not-total identification of the elements with the Body and Blood, even insisting on the existence of a logical proof for how a thing can be what it isn’t. Additionally, others have argued that a right understanding of the relationship between substance and accidents in Aristotle is incompatible with the Thomistic divorce of the two.

      To your second, I’m not completely sure what you mean precisely that Platonism is “harder in practice,” only I think your example actually bolsters my point. It is little surprise that you’ve found utility in Aristotle in natural science, which is notably a materialistic endeavor and which furthermore assumed its modern form through the influence of the medievals. Modern science is mechanistic and pragmatic, unable to inform what things are for or what they should be and therefore, in my opinion, what they actually are. It can only describe how they seem and what they do because, as Aristotle would have it, it confounds the essence of a thing with its visible instantiation. My case is that telos is where Plato’s metaphysics anchors itself to reality and where Aristotle’s drifts afield.

      God bless.

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      1. Tim Bonzon Avatar
        Tim Bonzon

        Thank you for continuing to discuss. I am happy to do this in any medium should this format not be convenient.

        I should have known better than to merely recite the elementary principles of Thomism. Your objection to the Thomistic formulation is valid. I lack the prerequisite knowledge to provide a rebuttal. I am also more likely to yield to someone such as yourself merely because you are clearly more familiar with the literature on this subject.

        To elaborate my claim that Platonism is “harder in practice” I merely mean that contemplating the Platonic form of blueberry Jam is much harder than approaching it from an Aristotelian perspective. Platonism makes sense for the things that come with a transcendent revelation like Man and the Incarnation. But nearly everything I encounter on a day to day basis is much more difficult to discern Platonically. No doubt the Platonic form of blueberry jam, if apprehended, would be immensely useful. But how is one able to apprehend it? What is the telos of blueberry jam?

        I am immensely interested in how you view Aristotelianism to stray from “reality”. I personally have thought largely the opposite, either from misunderstanding or from personal bias. To me it seems things that emphasize the causal nature of things tends towards a better description of their realities, physical and non-physical, and even their telos. If you could elaborate and show me where I am going wrong, I’d be very grateful.

        Thank you for your immense charity and willingness to engage with someone far less studied.

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      2. Garrett L. White Avatar
        Garrett L. White

        Hello again, Tim. I finally found a way to keep this thread going and wanted to open up the conversation again. I appreciate your willingness to keep contributing and didn’t want to let such an interesting discussion go to waste. Your jam example is helpful in demonstrating the difference I’d like to highlight. I can see where you coming from, given that there is probably something to be said for the pragmatic application of Aristotle’s categories as a framework for analyzing and replicating a blueberry jam scientifically. My point is that, as I see it, Aristotle is less useful than Plato for saying what blueberry jam should be. The former can only describe what it is and what it can be. The telos of blueberry jam is apprehended in the ideal form of blueberry jam. Anytime you tasted a jam that was, say, too sweet, you’d be implicitly comparing it to an invisible standard, a hypothetical perfect blueberry jam that embodies the purpose the jam is meant to accomplish. If someone added chopped beef to a blueberry jam, it would be easy in a Platonic framework to call that a categorical departure from the Form of blueberry jam, that is, that’s not what blueberry jam is meant to be. The jam is fundamentally an expression of that essential Form, and to deviate from that Form is to participate in some other essence, in this case. I suppose what I’m trying to articulate is that what Aristotle called accidents are not easily divorced from essence because the form of a thing always follows from the ideal to which it appeals, therefore to change the accidents is, in some sense, to alter its participation in the essence.

        I reciprocate your thanks for charity and fully concede the possibility that I simply misunderstand Aristotle. In short, this approach simply seems more reasonable to me: to say the jam is what it is because of what it’s supposed to be. And, further, just as man-made things are essentially defined by their expression of their creator’s intention, so all creation receives it’s essence from the intention of the Creator. The external, visible, material features of a thing are most basically expressions of that intent and are therefore not mutable independent of the essence, I suppose. The essence and its expression are tightly bound together.

        I realize it’s been a long time since this conversation, so I may have missed some things. I just thought your jam example was an excellent way to approach the question and wanted the chance to discuss it.

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